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Changing committee chairmanships in
Congress and a leadership shakeup at the Federal
Communications Commission have once again
opened a window of opportunity for comprehen-
sive telecommunications policy reform. While
new faces are taking over within Congress and at
the FCC, however, old issues continue to domi-
nate the telecom policy landscape.
This is largely due to the fact that, when
Congress last attempted to address these matters
five years ago by passing the historic Tele-
communications Act of 1996, legislators inten-
tionally avoided providing clear deregulatory
objectives for the FCC and instead delegated
broad and remarkably ambiguous authority to
the agency. That left the most important deregu-
latory decisions to the FCC, and, not surprising-
ly, the agency did a very poor job of following
through with a serious liberalization agenda.
The Telecom Act, with its backward-looking
focus on correcting the market problems of a
bygone era, has been a failure. Instead of thor-
oughly clearing out the regulatory deadwood of
the past, legislators and regulators have engaged
in an effort to rework regulatory paradigms that
where outmoded decades ago. In short, it was an
analog act for an increasingly digital world. The
new leadership in Congress and the FCC should
adopt a fresh approach based on deregulation
and free markets.
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Introduction
Important personnel changes on Capitol
Hill and at the Federal Communications
Commission could significantly alter the
telecommunications policy landscape in
upcoming months and years. New chairmen
of the House Commerce Committee, the
House Judiciary Committee, and the House
Telecommunications Subcommittee have
opened the possibility of many old and new
communications policy initiatives being
acted upon. Meanwhile, the FCC is in the
midst of a top-to-bottom leadership shakeup
that has given rise to a deregulatory-minded
new leader in Chairman Michael Powell.
Three of the other five commissioners' seats
will be filled shortly.
While new faces are taking over in
Congress and at the FCC, however, old issues
continue to dominate the telecom policy
landscape. That is largely due to the fact that,
when Congress last attempted to address
these matters five years ago by passing the
historic Telecommunications Act of 1996,
legislators intentionally avoided providing
clear deregulatory objectives for the FCC and
instead delegated broad and remarkably
ambiguous authority to the agency. That left
the most important deregulatory decisions
to the FCC, and, not surprisingly, the agency
did a very poor job of following through with
a serious liberalization agenda.
The Telecom Act was so fundamentally
flawed that it is difficult to imagine how even
the most deregulatory-minded FCC could
have brought about substantive change.
Among the statute's most notable flaws:
• The act's authors were fixated on a local
versus long-distance distinction in the tele-
phone market that is becoming increas-
ingly irrelevant as the two are bundled
together as one service.
• The act placed an unrealistic amount of faith
in “open-access” regulation to bring about
increased competition. This did little more,
however, than encourage unproductive
regulatory arbitrage as smaller resellers
came to rely on massively discounted
access to existing networks instead of
building their own infrastructure to com-
pete against incumbents. It did little to
advance the cause of genuine, facilities-
based communications competition.
• The act mandated an unprecedented expan-
sion of universal service subsidies in an
attempt to offer all Americans a growing
grab bag of telecom and high-technology
entitlements in addition to inexpensive
local phone service.
• The act was primarily a wireline bill; it
largely ignored the wireless sector.
• The act also ignored the new business models
and pricing structures that were being
developed by the wireless and satellite
sectors; those models and structures
could forever alter the way communica-
tions services are offered and priced in
America.
• The act provided some broadcast and
cable industry deregulation but left in
place many controls on ownership and opera-
tions of those sectors.
• The act also did not significantly alter
the manner in which the FCC micro-
manages the broadcast licensing pro-
cess. And the act did nothing to facilitate the
more efficient allocation of spectrum to meet
the exploding market demand for wire-
less services.
• The act all but ignored the significance of the
emergence of the Internet, except for a trou-
bling effort to censor the Net through
the Communications Decency Act,
which was eventually found unconstitu-
tional by the courts.
• The act did not anticipate the blossoming of
the broadband services marketplace and the
radical increase in demand for high-
speed Internet access.
• Finally, and perhaps most important,
the authors of the Telecom Act failed to
appreciate the reality and speed of both tech-
nological convergence and technological obso-
lescence. The waves of creative destruc-
tion that have swept through this indus-
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try in the wake of the act's passage have
made much of the act irrelevant or
counterproductive. Nonetheless, the
act's outdated market distinctions and
segregations remain firmly entrenched
in law.
In short, the Telecommunications Act of
1996 was an analog act for an increasingly
digital world. It reflected the backward-look-
ing fears and concerns of policymakers
obsessed with solving the market problems
of a bygone era. Instead of thoroughly clear-
ing out the regulatory deadwood of the past,
legislators and regulators have engaged in an
effort to rework regulatory paradigms that
where outmoded decades ago.
Regardless of who is to blame for the current
regulatory quagmire, congressional lawmakers
and FCC officials must now be willing to
admit that the Telecom Act was a failure and
that fresh thinking is needed to break the
current regulatory logjam. The following 10
policy objectives, ranked in priority order,
should serve as their new roadmap to the
long-standing goal of a more competitive
and deregulated communications market-
place: priority 1: repeal marketplace quaran-
tines, priority 2: end regulatory asymmetry,
priority 3: contain the forced-access visrus,
priority 4: pursue spectrum reform and pri-
vatization, priority 5: reform and devolve
universal service and the “E-Rate,” priority 6:
eliminate the “public interest” standard, pri-
ority 7: end “regulatory extortion” and
antitrust abuses, priority 8: end the broadcast
and Internet censorship crusade, priority 9:
clean up the telecom industry tax mess, and
priority 10: undertake sweeping FCC reform
and devise a closure plan.
As the Appendix to this paper makes clear,
a surprisingly large body of academic evi-
dence supports this blueprint for reform.
Nonetheless, the outdated policies and prior-
ities of the past remain firmly entrenched
within Congress and at the FCC. To correct
this, policymakers should undertake an
ambitious reform agenda governed by this
paper's 10 recommendations.
Priority 1: Repeal
Marketplace Quarantines
Although the Telecommunications Act of
1996 took some limited steps toward market
liberalization, the pace of deregulation
remains much too timid. Regulators appear
unwilling to let go of the reins of power and
see what happens. Previous deregulatory ini-
tiatives were carried out in a “cold-turkey”
fashion, with date-certain deregulatory
timetables and a rapid sunsetting of agency
rules and market restrictions. That worked to
the advantage of consumers who were almost
immediately provided more options, better
service, and lower prices. In a similar vein,
Congress and the FCC must take steps to
speed up the process of deregulation of the
communications sector.
To realize that objective, Congress and the
FCC should begin by eliminating market-
place quarantines that continue to shackle
industry players. For example, all remaining
restrictions on local telephone exchange car-
riers should be phased out by a date certain,
and antitrust laws can govern market power
concerns in the near term. Wireless spectrum
ownership caps and cable and broadcast
industry ownership restrictions should also
be eliminated. And the many remaining
restrictions on foreign ownership of American
telecommunications carriers should be lifted
to encourage competition and investment
from global players.
FCC officials should also make better use
of the forbearance authority they were grant-
ed under section 401 of the Telecom Act,
which allows them to refrain from applying
old or new regulations to carriers if doing so
does not benefit consumers. Regrettably, the
activist-minded FCC of recent years has
refused to use this deregulatory power in any
meaningful way. Section 402 of the Telecom
Act also commands the FCC to undertake a
biennial review of all FCC regulations to
determine what rules are no longer needed.
Again, the FCC has chosen not to use this
deregulatory tool constructively but rather to
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engage in pro forma reviews that have largely
justified almost all ongoing FCC regulatory
activities. The new FCC should use this tool
to help conduct a thorough, top-to-bottom
housecleaning of the agency's rulebooks.
To guide these efforts, congressional poli-
cymakers and FCC officials should start by
adopting a new pro-deregulatory ethic that
can be stated as follows: Individuals and entities
should be free to create and offer to the public any
technological good or communications service they
want, whenever they want, however they want, and
on whatever terms they and their customers find
mutually agreeable. There is no longer any rea-
son to govern the telecommunications mar-
ketplace differently from any other major
American industry sector.
Priority 2: End
Regulatory Asymmetry
Perhaps the most problematic policy issue
now facing the FCC is the differing regulato-
ry structures and standards that govern for-
merly distinct industry sectors. Within the
market, few actors continue to refer to them-
selves as “cable companies,” “telephone
providers,” “cellular firms,” or “broadcast-
ers.” The increasing reality of technological
convergence means that those formerly dis-
tinct industry sectors and companies are now
integrating and searching for ways to offer
consumers a bundled set of communications
services under a single brand name.
Despite that, FCC regulations are stuck in
a regulatory time warp that lags behind cur-
rent market realities by several decades. For
example, the agency is structured along rigid
sectoral lines with different bureaus oversee-
ing specific industries. Those bureaus
include the Common Carrier Bureau, the
Cable Bureau, the Wireless Bureau, the Mass
Media bureau, and the International Bureau.
Those bureaus were spawned by the
Communications Act of 1934 and subse-
quent statutes and regulations, which carved
the telecom world into administratively neat
legal “titles,” such as Title II (for telephony)
and Title VI (for cable services) even though
telephone and cable carriers are both striving
to provide essentially the same service today.
Regrettably, the Telecommunications Act of
1996 did nothing to alter the fundamental
nature of those increasingly irrelevant and
artificial legal distinctions.
That means that the FCC is currently reg-
ulating apples as apples, oranges as oranges,
and bananas as bananas, when everyone is
trying to provide consumers a mixed fruit
salad of communications services. Again, the
ultimate goal from the industry's perspective
is to provide a bundled, branded commodity.
In other words, provide the consumer with
the full range of communications services
including voice telephony, wireless cellular,
data communications, and Internet access.
Asymmetrical FCC regulations and bureau
structures retard this development.
The current regulatory arrangement is
indefensible since it means that firms
attempting to offer comparable services are
being regulated under dissimilar legal stan-
dards. It betrays a cardinal tenet of American
jurisprudence—equal treatment under the
law—and, from an economic point of view,
could produce distorted market outcomes.
Therefore, the agency must end this asym-
metry, not by “regulating up” to put everyone
on equal footing, but rather by “deregulating
down.” To the extent the agency continues to
subject the industry to ground rules, it should
consider borrowing a page from trade law by
adopting the equivalent of a most-favored-
nation clause for telecommunications. In a
nutshell, this policy would state that “any
communications carrier seeking to offer a new
service or entering a new line of business
should be regulated no more stringently than
its least regulated competitor.”
Most-favored-nation status for telecommu-
nications firms would ensure that regulatory
parity existed within the telecommunications
market as the lines between existing technolo-
gies and industry sectors continue to blur.
Placing everyone on the same deregulated level
playing field should be at the heart of
telecommunications policy to ensure that all
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levels of government accord nondiscrimina-
tory regulatory treatment to competing
providers and technologies.
It is important to realize, however, that if
policymakers can successfully achieve the first
priority of more comprehensively deregulating
this market, then the parity problem will go
away naturally over time. To the extent any
rules and regulations must remain on the
books, however, an effort should be made to
equalize treatment of carriers and technologies
to achieve the proverbial “level playing field.”
Priority 3: Contain the
Forced-Access Virus
Worse than the lack of deregulation in
recent years has been the imposition of a new
regulatory regime: open access. In a nutshell,
open-access mandates require that a compa-
ny or specific industry sector be required to
share its facilities with rival companies so
that those rivals may have access to a broader
array of consumers or citizens.
Open access, therefore, is really forced
access, since it is a government-mandated
policy, albeit one that is purportedly intend-
ed to create a more competitive marketplace.
Although a forced-access regime was envi-
sioned by the framers of the Telecom Act as a
way to help open up markets, two important
restrictions applied: (1) forced access would
apply only to the local telephone exchange
carrier's existing local wireline network, not
other segments of its network or other carriers' net-
works or other carriers' technologies, and (2)
forced access was generally viewed as a transi-
tional regulatory regime that would last only
until such time as greater facilities-based com-
petition developed within the local telephone
marketplace.
Regrettably, those two guidelines have
been essentially tossed aside by regulators,
who have exhibited an overzealous desire to
apply forced-access regulations to almost any
industry sector or technology. Today forced
access is being proposed for cable systems
and other broadband networks, wireless net-
works, instant messaging services via the Net,
and communications systems within multi-
tenant buildings, just to name a few.
But while infrastructure sharing appears to
be all the rage, it is hardly the path to true
telecommunications freedom. In fact, it is real-
ly just communications socialism: collective
control of the underlying means of produc-
tion. Genuine head-to-head, facilities-based
competition will not develop so long as regu-
lators are proposing technology and network
sharing as the universal cure-all for America's
communications woes. Worse yet, forced
access demands the continuation of a regime
of price controls within the communications
sector since someone must set the intercon-
nection or lease price and that someone will
end up being regulatory officials.
If forced access has a future in the com-
munications industry, then industry compe-
tition, innovation, and investment do not.
The new Congress and FCC must reject the
use of this insidious industrial policy tech-
nique as a means of bringing about a more
competitive marketplace.
Priority 4: Pursue Spectrum
Reform and Privatization
Most communications industry policy
issues provoke intense academic debate and
disagreement. Electromagnetic spectrum
reform, however, is the exception to that rule.
There exists today overwhelming intellectual
support on both the political left and right
for the concept of comprehensive spectrum
reform.
Luckily, the FCC has gradually come to
accept the logic of a free market in spectrum
allocation and management. The use of auc-
tions was a major step forward in this regard.
And the agency has recently signaled its inter-
est in allowing spectrum license holders
greater flexibility to ensure that this valuable
resource can be put to its most efficient use.
Artificial operational restraints must also be
eliminated. For example, spectrum caps cur-
rently exist that restrict the overall amount of
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spectrum that companies can use in the mar-
ketplace. This discourages investment and
innovation, and, therefore, the FCC should
allow wireless providers the flexibility to
aggregate spectrum in any way and in any
combination they wish to provide better ser-
vice to the public.
But auctions and flexible use, while impor-
tant steps, are not enough. The task of spec-
trum reform will be complete only when poli-
cymakers grant full property rights in spectrum.
Just as America has a full-fledged private prop-
erty rights regime for real estate, so too should
wireless spectrum properties be accorded the
full protection of the law. As long as spectrum
is parceled out by federal regulators under a
licensing system, the process will be a politi-
cized mess. The alternative—a pure free market
for the ownership, control, and trade of spec-
trum properties—should be a top priority for
the new administration.
To accomplish this task, the FCC should
grant spectrum holders a property right in
their existing or future allocations. This
means spectrum holders would no longer
lease their allocations from the federal govern-
ment but instead would own them outright
and be able to use them (or sell them) as they
saw fit. This also means that all arbitrary fed-
eral regulatory oversight, including content or
speech controls on broadcasters, of the spec-
trum would end. Federal regulators would be
responsible only for addressing technical tres-
pass violations and resolving disputes that
arose between holders of adjoining spectrum.
Spectrum for all potential uses should be
allocated by auction. Firms would file their
bidding proposals with the FCC and then
post bonds proving they had enough capital
to bid credibly for the given allocation. The
commission also could establish competitive
bidding rules (as it did in previous auctions)
to ensure that bidding collusion does not
take place. These auctions would not be one-
time events; they would be ongoing as spec-
trum claims developed and multiplied.
It is important that policymakers not rig
the auctions in any way, either to favor cer-
tain demographic groups or to artificially
boost the amount of money raised for the
federal Treasury by such auctions. The pri-
mary goal of spectrum auctions is to allocate
spectrum to its most highly valued use by
offering it up for competitive bidding, not to
funnel money into the federal coffers.
Priority 5: Reform and
Devolve UniversalService
and the “E-Rate”
The extensive body of academic literature
on universal service mechanisms within the
telecommunications marketplace points to a
single conclusion: the system is a relic of a
bygone age that continues to distort market
pricing and competitive entry. The system
has been riddled with inefficient cross-subsi-
dies, artificially inflated prices, geographic
rate averaging, and hidden phone bill charges
for average Americans. While some reform
efforts have been entertained in recent years,
they have been quite limited and mostly cos-
metic in nature.
To make matters worse, section 254 of the
Telecommunications Act mandated that the
FCC take steps to expand the future defini-
tion of universal service. It did not take the
agency long to follow up on this request. In
May 1997 the agency created the “E-Rate”
program (known among its critics as the
“Gore tax” since it was heavily promoted by
then–vice president Al Gore), which unilater-
ally established a new government bureauc-
racy to help wire schools and libraries to the
Internet. The FCC then dictated that the
American people would pick up the $2.25 bil-
lion annual tab for the program through a
hidden tax on everyone's phone bill.
Although the constitutionality of the E-
Rate program was questioned initially, the
program withstood court challenges and early
legislative reform efforts. Consequently, the E-
Rate threatens to become yet another
entrenched Washington entitlement program
and further set back needed reform efforts.
The new FCC should abolish the current
system of federal entitlements and devolve to
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the states responsibility for any subsidy pro-
grams that are deemed necessary in the
future. A federal telecommunications welfare
state is no longer justified. If schools desire
specific technologies or communications
connections, they can petition their state or
local leaders for funding the same way they
would for textbooks or chalkboards: through
an accountable, on-budget state appropria-
tion. There is nothing unique or special
about communications or computing tech-
nologies that justifies a federal entitlement
program while other tools of learning are
paid for through state and local budgets.
Priority 6: Eliminate the
“Public Interest” Standard
At a minimum, if nothing else is accom-
plished in the next four years at the FCC,
something must be done to address the
grotesque abuse of the so-called public inter-
est standard by the agency. The agency has a
long and distressing history of using its
ambiguous public interest authority to justify
sweeping industrial policies for multiple
industry sectors.
But what truly is “in the public interest”?
How is that term defined? In a nutshell, it is
whatever FCC regulators say it is. Since pas-
sage of the Radio Act of 1927 and the
Communications Act of 1934, FCC officials
have lived under the paradoxical fiction that
the standard is indeed knowable, but only
they know what it is! The rank hubris of this
completely arbitrary position is inexcusable.
What five commissioners think in their own
minds is “in the public interest” is, in reality,
just their own political judgments and philo-
sophical predispositions.
What then is “the public interest”? It is
whatever the public says it is. How is that
determined? By the interaction of millions of
diverse interests and actors in a free market-
place. Asking the FCC to define the public
interest for the communications sector is akin
to asking a hypothetical Federal Automobile
Commission to define what types of cars con-
sumers will demand next year and then deter-
mine which firms should be able to supply
them and on what terms. Just as the forces of
supply and demand are spontaneously cali-
brated by a free market in cars, computers,
corn, or coffee, so too can the public interest in
communications be discovered by the volun-
tary interactions of companies and consumers
in a free market. The FCC’s public interest
standard should be abandoned immediately.
If, however, lawmakers insist on continu-
ing to rely on public interest FCC oversight,
the standard should be defined clearly in law.
The second-best alternative would be to
define the public interest standard as a “con-
sumer welfare” standard until such time as
Congress wisely sees fit to abandon its use
entirely. This new consumer welfare standard
should focus on
1. maximization of consumer welfare via the
broadening of the general scope of indi-
vidual decisionmaking within telecom-
munications markets;
2. use of market processes instead of regula-
tory proceedings whenever possible; and
3. full protection of First Amendment
rights and equal First Amendment treat-
ment of all communications media,
whether print or electronic.
Although many other FCC rules or poli-
cies need to be reformed or abandoned
entirely, no other reform effort will have as
much immediate and lasting impact on the
industry or its consumers.
Priority 7: End “Regulatory
Extortion” and Antitrust
Abuses 
In the wake of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, the industry has witnessed a
steady rise in merger and acquisition activity.
That was to be expected. Every deregulatory
experiment has been followed by a wave of
industry consolidation as well as numerous
business failures.
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However, the FCC is playing a much more
active role in reviewing industry merger and
acquisition activity than it did during previ-
ous deregulations. In fact, the agency now
subjects proposed industry combinations to
rigorous antitrust review even though the
FCC has no clear statutory mandate or
authority to do so. Once again, agency offi-
cials are loosely construing the public inter-
est standard, in this case to grant themselves
sweeping powers to micromanage business
combinations.
As a result, merging companies are now
subjected to what might be best referred to as
a “death by a thousand cuts” regulatory
process at the FCC. The agency requires that
merging firms enter into a multitude of “vol-
untary” agreements, which govern their long-
term business operations. For example, the
mergers of SBC and Ameritech, MCI and
WorldCom, AOL and Time Warner, and
AT&T and its cable partners were all subject-
ed to detailed consent decrees that set out the
terms under which those companies would
provide service in future years.
The result has been the creation of a new de
facto regulatory bureau at the FCC for antitrust
review. Through this gradual mission creep, the
FCC has been able to impose on communica-
tions carriers added regulatory burdens that the
agency might not have been able to apply
through more routine regulatory methods. As a
result, almost no proposed business combina-
tion makes it through the agency today with-
out a lengthy list of operational conditions
attached. Agency officials have discovered that
this sort of back-door regulation is an easy way
to exact favors and promises from companies
in exchange for final agency approval of the
proposed combination.
Some critics of this process have rightly
labeled this phenomenon “regulatory extor-
tion” or “political blackmail” since most
companies have no choice but to agree to the
regulatory conditions in order to ensure
merger approval. Worse yet, these conces-
sions come in addition to the routine
antitrust reviews that merging companies can
expect from the Department of Justice, the
Federal Trade Commission, state public utility
commissions, and international antitrust
authorities. The combined effect of this increas-
ing and overlapping merger meddling has been
lengthy delays in merger approval, which slow
marketplace investment and innovation.
The new administration and Congress
must end the FCC's regulatory extortion
racket and force the agency to cease all merg-
er review activities since they are tantamount
to yet another attempt to artificially order
the marketplace and engage in regulatory
crystal ball gazing.
Priority 8: End the
Broadcast and Internet
Censorship Crusade
Legislators of all political stripes are increas-
ingly prone to call publicly for an “end to polit-
ical partisanship” and a “spirit of cooperation”
as way out of particularly contentious public
policy logjams. But one example of an issue
that has a long and rather lamentable history
of remarkable political bipartisanship and
cooperation is broadcast industry and
Internet-sector censorship.
Democrats and Republicans seem to have
little problem agreeing that speech controls
on radio, television, or the Internet are “in the
public interest.” In fact, the endless crusade to
“protect children” and “clean up” radio, tele-
vision, and now the Net has resulted in a
string of censorship efforts throughout the
past century.
For example, for many decades, the FCC—
under both Republican and Democratic leader-
ship—attempted to enforce the unneeded and
counterproductive Fairness Doctrine, which
required licensed spectrum holders to provide
equal time to diverse viewpoints. The doctrine
backfired, however, and ended up discouraging
vigorous debate on issues since many stations
decided to forgo controversial programming
rather than risk FCC fines or license revocation.
The agency also enforced de facto radio and
television speech codes through its license
renewal process. The FCC has regulated the
8
Almost no pro-
posed business
combination
makes it through
the agency today
without a lengthy
list of operational
conditions
attached.
content and placement of advertising in past
decades. And there has been a litany of efforts
aimed at improving the quality of program-
ming for children on television, including the
Children's Television Act of 1990.
While many of the older speech restric-
tions have been struck down as unconstitu-
tional by the courts or abandoned by the FCC
over time because of enforcement difficulties,
Congress's appetite for censorship activities
appears insatiable. Recent years have wit-
nessed a slate of Net-related speech controls
including the Communications Decency Act,
“V-Chip” mandates, the Child Online
Protection Act, and a long list of filtering
mandates and anti-“Spam” bills.
The problem here is clear: neither party
seems ready to take the First Amendment
seriously. Free speech rights and the First
Amendment are of paramount importance
to individual liberty and should be fully
honored and protected against government
interference. Moreover, electronic media
(radio, television, telephones, the Internet)
should be accorded the same protections
received by print media (newspapers, maga-
zines, newsletters). There is no conceivable jus-
tification for subjecting electronic media to a
different standard than their print counter-
parts.
There is nothing wrong, of course, with
efforts by individual families or private enti-
ties to use screening technologies to filter the
material accessible within their own house-
holds or organizations. It is an entirely differ-
ent matter, however, for government officials
to mandate the use of such technologies in
an attempt to sanitize cyberspace.
Priority 9: Clean Up the
Telecom Industry Tax Mess
America's increasingly competitive commu-
nications sector also remains one of its most
heavily taxed. But the telecommunications
industry is no longer being treated as a regulat-
ed monopoly, so policymakers should stop tax-
ing it as though it were. That is, as competition
comes to communications in America, tax poli-
cies based on the regulated monopoly model of
the past must be comprehensively reformed.
Some of the current taxes are federal and
can be addressed by Congress or the FCC. A
good example is the federal 3 percent excise
tax on telecommunications put in place in
1898 during the Spanish-American War. That
anachronistic tax should be repealed immedi-
ately. And the hidden taxes associated with
the E-Rate, or “Gore Tax,” program should
also be repealed or at least devolved to a lower
level of government for administration.
Regrettably, however, the more problemat-
ic tax policy issues arise from burdensome
state and local mandates. For example, many
states impose discriminatory ad valorem taxes
on interstate communications services by tax-
ing telecommunications business property at
rates higher than other property, driving up
costs for consumers. Federal protections
against such taxes—already in effect for rail-
roads, airlines, and trucking—should be
extended to telecommunications. Many gov-
ernments are using consumer telephone bills
as cash cows, imposing multiple and extreme-
ly high taxes on services. Such taxes should be
slashed to a single tax per state and locality,
and filing and auditing procedures should be
radically streamlined. Finally, Internet access
taxes and tolls should be permanently banned
since those charges are a burdensome levy on
the free flow of information and the construc-
tion of new interstate broadband networks.
Priority 10: 
Undertake Sweeping Agency
Reform and Craft a Plan for
Eventual Closure
The FCC is not operated by evil people
with malevolent intentions. Indeed, quite the
opposite is the case. The FCC is populated by
well-intentioned individuals who honestly
want to create a more competitive communi-
cations marketplace.
But therein lies the folly of their magnani-
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mous efforts. They harder they try, the more
convoluted and counterproductive the regu-
latory process becomes. For example, the
agency has issued numerous and remarkably
voluminous rulemakings on spurring compe-
tition in the local telephone marketplace,
which was mandated by the Telecom Act of
1996. The first rulemaking on this front was
the agency's now-famous Interconnection
Order of August 1996, a mammoth 737-page
document with more than 3,200 footnotes.
The edict, which ranks as one of the longest
and most complicated rules in the history of
regulatory policymaking in the United States,
resulted in an endless flow of litigation and
court battles. In fact, earlier this year, the
Supreme Court decided to hear another
round of cases dealing with ambiguous and
controversial Telecom Act regulations.
What is sadly ironic about this example is
that it is evident that FCC officials honestly
hoped to bring about a more competitive
telecommunications marketplace through their
elaborate interconnection proceedings. This
stands in stark contrast with the previous 100
years of telecommunications regulation, during
which regulators sought to create powerful
monopolies and shelter them from new
entrants. So even the harshest FCC critic must
admit that an important philosophical shift has
taken place within the regulatory community.
Good intentions, however, are no substi-
tute for sound economics and a straightfor-
ward legal regime. Tinkering endlessly with
market pricing standards as a carrot, or using
selective entry rules as a stick, is hardly a
sound way to bring about a more competitive
marketplace. Instead, it simply breeds a self-
perpetuating vicious circle of politicized rule-
making. Each regulatory proceeding gives
rise to several additional proceedings to
answer questions not satisfactorily resolved
during the first go-round. In the legal battles
that inevitably ensue, armies of lawyers, econ-
omists, and industry consultants are called in
to provide their “expert” interpretations of the
rules in question. But in the end, this process
only results in more confusion and ambiguity
and a growing regulatory bureaucracy.
In fact, in the wake of the passage of the
Telecom Act, FCC spending and staffing
have grown to all-time highs. Last year the
FCC requested a gross budget of almost $280
million and total staffing equivalent to 1,975
full-time employees. By comparison, 10 years
ago, FCC spending stood at $108 million
and staffing was 1,734 full-time employees.
In other words, the FCC's budget has essen-
tially doubled over the past decade, and the
agency has hired roughly 250 additional
bureaucrats over the same period. It is
unclear how anyone can claim this represents
“deregulation.”
Competition is a process, not an end-
point. Competition cannot be “created” by
merely implementing and enforcing one reg-
ulatory edict after another. An unbounded
regulatory hubris exists at the agency today,
however, which argues that this is exactly the
course the FCC should continue to follow if
full-fledged telecommunications competi-
tion is to become a reality. But that can never
be the case.
There is no optimal number of competi-
tors in a given market. There is no way to even
adequately define what a “market” is anymore.
There are no “perfectly competitive” industry
sectors. Every market suffers from short-term
setbacks and suboptimal scenarios now and
then. There are no “fair prices.” There are only
the terms to which producers and consumers
can agree. And, most important, there is no
single standard that can adequately define
what truly lies “in the public interest.” Again,
the public interest is whatever millions of con-
suming Americans say it is.
Still, this is the game the FCC wants to
play: defining markets, establishing the
proper number of competitors, setting the
terms of service, gauging fair prices, and pre-
tending it has the godlike ability to gauge
what lies in the public interest. That is sheer
folly. And it has done very little to bring
about a more competitive state of affairs in
the telecommunications marketplace. It’s
time for the FCC to simply give up, declare its
mission accomplished, throw a big party, and
retire to the country.
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Conclusion: Ending the
“Chicken Little Complex”
A few general words of advice about gov-
ernance in the Information Age are in order.
The telecommunications industry is full of
doomsayers and naysayers. The “Chicken
Little complex” runs rampant throughout
this sector.
Many so-called consumer groups—which
really don't represent consumer interests at
all—ritualistically proclaim that the prover-
bial sky is ready to fall in the communica-
tions sector at any moment. It is not surpris-
ing though to hear such rhetoric espoused by
those groups since their not-so-hidden agen-
da is really to expand the parameters and
responsibilities of the regulatory Leviathan.
What is shocking and quite sad, however,
is the pervasiveness of this pessimistic atti-
tude and Chicken Little rhetoric within the
industry itself. In fact, many industry leaders
reject proposals to comprehensively liberalize
their own marketplace, either in a pathetic
attempt to placate regulators or because they
honestly fear what a deregulated marketplace
might mean for them and their companies.
One can only imagine what goes through
the head of the average telecom CEO when he
goes to bed at night: Who is going to invade
my turf? Will someone else be able to serve his
customers better? What’s going to happen if
my competitors raise prices to reflect the actu-
al cost of providing service? How will they sur-
vive without the subsidies they have been liv-
ing off of for so long? And so on.
But this paranoia is a normal and quite
healthy part of countless other American
industry sectors. A free market should not be
rejected just because it poses risks. In anoth-
er sense, the industry’s Chicken Little atti-
tude can be viewed as nothing more than the
repackaging of its unremitting pleas for spe-
cial protection and regulatory favoritism.
Regardless, the new leaders in Congress
and at the FCC need to understand that,
while change is difficult, it should not be
resisted or rejected. There is no need to pan-
der to the Chicken Little community. The sky
will not fall. Indeed, it only promises to grow
brighter as the regulatory walls around the
telecommunications sector come down.
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